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oAbstract
This paper presents the final economic results of the UK Employment Retention and
Advancement (ERA) programme. ERA’s distinctive combination of post-employment
advisory support and financial incentives was designed to help low-income individuals
who entered work sustain employment and advance in the labour market. ERA targeted
three groups. ERA produced short-term earnings gains for two lone parent target groups.
However, these effects generally faded after the programme ended, largely because the
control group caught up with the ERA group. For the New Deal 25 Plus target group
(mostly long term unemployed men), ERA produced modest but sustained increases in
employment and earnings.
JEL Codes: I38, J18, C93
Keywords: Financial incentives; Welfare-to-work; Long term unemployed; Field experiment1 Introduction
This paper presents the final results on the implementation, impacts, costs, and
economic benefits of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA)
programme, which sought to improve the labour market prospects of low-paid workers
and long-term unemployed people. The paper also highlights some of the methodo-
logical contributions of the demonstration, such as the use of cross-office analysis to
learn from positive impacts in order to refine policy and, in time, raise overall effective-
ness. Launched in 2003 in selected Jobcentre Plus offices, which administer Government
cash benefits and employment services, the programme was envisioned as a ‘next step’ in
British welfare-to-work policies. Participants in ERA had access to a distinctive set of
‘post-employment’ job coaching and financial incentives, which were added to the job
placement services that unemployed people could normally receive through Jobcentre
Plus. Once employed, ERA participants could receive at least 2 years of advice and assist-
ance from an employment adviser to help them continue working and advance in work.
Those who consistently worked full time could receive substantial cash rewards, called
‘retention bonuses’. Participants could also receive help with tuition costs and cash
rewards for completing training courses while employed. The programme has been care-
fully evaluated though a large-scale randomised control trial.2015 Hendra et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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work and advancement:
 ‘The NDLP group’: Unemployed lone parents receiving Income Support¹ and
volunteering for the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) welfare-to-work
programme;
 ‘The WTC group’: Lone parents working part time and receiving Working Tax
Credit (WTC), which supplements the wages of low-paid workers;
 ‘The ND25+ group’: Long-term unemployed people aged 25 or older receiving
Jobseeker’s Allowance² and who were required to participate in the New Deal 25
Plus (ND25+) welfare-to-work programme.
These target groups faced somewhat different types of challenges that impeded their
success in the labour market. A goal of the evaluation was to determine whether ERA
could help each of them similarly, and whether it worked better for some than others.
This paper thus compares the results for all three target groups and provides the final
evidence of the programme’s effectiveness over a 5-year follow-up period.
Over 16,000 people from six regions of Britain (East Midlands, London, North East
England, North West England, Scotland, and Wales) applied to the programme. Random
assignment was used in order to conclusively test whether or not ERA helped participants
work more, earn more, advance further and achieve better outcomes in other specific
areas. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the programme, while the
remainder served as a ‘business-as-usual’ control group—a counterfactual which did not
receive any assistance from ERA and thus provided a benchmark indicating what would
have happened in the absence of the ERA programme.³1.1 Findings in brief
Prior to the launch of ERA, the New Deal programmes and Jobcentre Plus offered little
further assistance to participants once they obtained jobs. Thus, ERA was a major depart-
ure from the ‘business as usual’ approach, and there was no guarantee that Jobcentre Plus
could implement the model. The evaluation found that, after initial start-up problems,
and despite variations in quality across offices and staff, ERA was largely implemented as
designed, attesting that it was feasible to attach a post-employment component to the
work of Jobcentre Plus or other employment agencies.
ERA produced short-term earnings gains for the two lone parent target groups: the
NDLP and WTC groups, which were made up mostly of women. The early gains resulted
from increases in the proportion of participants who worked full time (at least 30 h per
week). This pattern aligns with the programme’s requirement that participants work full
time in order to qualify for the employment retention bonus. These effects generally faded
in the later years, after the programme ended. However, an earnings gain appears to have
lasted longer among NDLP participants who were better educated, though initially un-
employed. Compared with other unemployed lone parents, this group may have had more
unrealised potential to succeed in work, which ERA may have tapped into. From a cost-
benefit perspective, ERA did not produce encouraging results for the lone parent groups,
with the exception of the NDLP better-educated subgroup.
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men) in the ND25+ target group. For them, ERA produced modest but sustained
increases in employment and substantial and sustained increases in earnings. These
positive effects emerged after the first year and were still evident at the end of the
follow-up period. The earnings gains were accompanied by lasting reductions in bene-
fits receipt over the 5-year follow-up period. ERA proved cost-effective for this group
from the perspectives of the participants themselves, the government budget, and soci-
ety as a whole. This is a noteworthy achievement for a group that is widely considered
among the most difficult to help.2 Background
ERA addressed the problem of low rates of employment retention and advancement
among disadvantaged workers. Recurring unemployment and a lack of advancement
are common among disadvantaged and low-paid workers. Many become entrenched in
a ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle in which they shift repeatedly between low-wage work and un-
employment. Often these individuals seek government benefits to supplement their in-
comes. Importantly, the ‘low-pay, no-pay’ cycle may persist even during periods of high
aggregate employment levels; it is not simply a consequence of weak labour demand
(Nunn et al., 2007).
Research has demonstrated that many individuals who struggle to retain employment
and advance in work face a multitude of barriers to finding and keeping well-paid jobs,
including low education levels, difficulties accessing transport, and poor health. Some
studies suggest that moving frequently between work and benefits may have a ‘scarring’
effect, because individuals who spend more than a few weeks unemployed have been
shown to experience chronic difficulty in re-establishing themselves in the labour mar-
ket (Arulampalam, 2001). Recent research from the US suggests that those who have
been out of the labour market six months or longer are much less likely to receive calls
for interviews, even when they have relevant experience (Kroft et al., 2013). Some re-
search also suggests that the experience of low-wage employment may have almost as
large an effect as unemployment on future prospects (Stewart, 2007). In the wake of
the great recession, concerns have also mounted about prospects for the long term un-
employed (Elsby et al. 2010).
Low-wage workers tend to leave jobs for a variety of reasons. For example, some have
short-term contracts, which they often accept reluctantly because they have difficulty
finding more permanent employment. Some, of course, cannot meet employers’ per-
formance expectations. Others leave work by choice, because the jobs are not the kind
of work they want to do, they are unhappy with the pay or work conditions, or they ex-
perience situational problems that undermine their performance. Lone parents often
encounter particular difficulties with the cost and reliability of childcare and transport,
balancing work and childcare responsibilities, and employers who are unwilling to
accommodate their employees’ family responsibilities.
Advancing within work is also increasingly difficult for low-wage workers. In fact,
wage mobility in the UK has declined since the 1980s (Dickens 2000b; Stewart and
Swaffield, 1999), and earnings volatility has declined (although not significantly) since
the 1990s (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2014). Wage inequality, after growing strongly in the
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and Etheridge, 2010). Instead of moving into better jobs over time, many low-wage
workers remain stuck in low-level positions that require few higher skills, are often part
time or temporary, and offer few opportunities for training (Dickens, 2000a unpub-
lished). Such conditions make it difficult to climb a career ladder. Some research also
suggests that employees who earn the lowest wages and whose working conditions are
poor are generally less able to negotiate better working conditions for themselves (Dex
and Smith, 2001) and are actually more likely to return to benefits than to improve
their earnings (Dickens 2000b). Lone parents who work face the added challenge of
balancing family and work responsibilities, which may make it more difficult to pursue
advancement opportunities, including working longer hours.
Earnings supplements as a policy response. In recent years, there have been a number
of experimental programmes using randomised control trials (RCTs) to examine the
effects of temporary earnings supplements provided to individuals to support them in
the early months of new employment (Blank et al. 1999; Martinson & Hamilton, 2011;
Michalopoulos et al., 2005). It is well known that high rates of job loss are related to
low wages and other poor job characteristics (Stewart, 2007; Hershey & Pavetti, 1997).
From this perspective, the earnings supplement increases the effective wage during the
first year of employment, which helps “make work pay” during a period when most en-
trants are earning entry level wages.
Several earlier studies have shown that provision of financial incentives can promote
employment among low-wage workers. Rigorous evaluations using random assignment
experiments of several financial incentive programmes, including the Minnesota Family
Investment Program (MFIP), the New Hope Project, and the Canadian Self-Sufficiency
Project (SSP) are remarkably consistent in demonstrating positive effects on economic
outcomes (Michalopoulos et al. 2005). This research shows that individuals offered
financial incentives are more likely to work, earn more, and have more income than
those in a control group not offered the financial incentives. While all of these
programmes produced positive effects on employment during the operational period,
the effects subsequently faded soon before or just after the financial incentives
ended mostly due to control group members “catching up” to the progress of
programme group members.
A subsequent generation of programmes targeting out-of-work welfare recipients
has combined financial incentives with a variety of employment related services
aimed at helping the recipients find and retain jobs. The services provided by these
programmes ranged from simple job search assistance to more extensive services
prior to and after jobs were found. SSP Plus, an experimental programme provid-
ing financial incentives and limited employment services to single-parent families
on welfare in Canada, found sustained effects that exceeded those from a
programme that provided financial incentives alone (Robins et al., 2008). More re-
cently, one programme in the Employment Retention and Advancement demonstration
in the United States (Texas ERA) provided both financial incentives and a rich assortment
of pre- and post-employment services to encourage stable employment. A multi-site ran-
domised control trial of Texas ERA showed some statistically significant increases in em-
ployment and earnings, particularly for the Corpus Christi site. These effects persisted
through the end of the 4 year follow-up period (Hendra et al., 2010). The Employment
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the first European RCT of this policy strategy.2.1 Policy context
ERA was envisioned as a next step in Britain’s ‘welfare-to-work’ policy, which has been
evolving since the early 1970s, when the government began supplementing the wages of
working families to help them overcome the cycle of unemployment and in-work poverty.
In its third year in office in 1999, the Labour Government faced a quarter to a third
of children living in relative poverty—a rate that, if measured by the contemporary
index of the proportion of families with incomes below 60 per cent of the national me-
dian, had doubled between 1979 and 1995. More than half of lone parents remained
out of work. In response, the government made two important pledges:
 to halve the child poverty rate by 2010 and to eliminate child poverty by 2020, and
 to raise the proportion of lone parents in paid work for at least some hours each
week to 70 per cent by 2010.
The policies that ensued—particularly those directed at lone parents—were largely
aimed at meeting these goals. For example, tax credits were designed to ‘make work
pay’ by providing enough incentive to work while meeting the increasing challenge of
keeping low-paid workers’ standards of living in sync with those of the working major-
ity who have higher earnings. In 1999, the Working Families Tax Credit was intro-
duced, offering more generous wage supplements to low-income workers as well as
help covering most of the formal cost of childcare. This reform was underpinned by
the National Minimum Wage, which took effect in the same year, and which many be-
lieved was essential, in part, in order to prevent employers from reducing wages in the
face of higher government-funded wage supplements. In 2003, the Working Families
Tax Credit was replaced by the Working Tax Credit, which was the first major tax
credit also available to low-paid workers without children, and the Child Tax Credit,
which simplified support so that families with children could have a clearer idea of how
much they could expect to receive in and out of work.
The policy environment has changed substantially since the time of the ERA evaluation.
In particular, a new active labour market programme—the ‘Work Programme’—replaced
the New Deal provision in June 2011, and the system of welfare payment in place at the
time of the experiment is being replaced with a single “Universal Credit”. However, the
ERA evidence remains highly relevant in particular due to the focus on in-work support
to help part time workers as well as ERA’s emphasis (and effectiveness) on helping the
long term unemployed back into the labour market. The current government in the
United Kingdom has identified in-work progression as an important priority in its welfare
reform agenda and is actively exploring innovative ways to promote in-work progression
under the universal credit.2.2 The ERA programme
Table 1 summarises the staff and services available through ERA compared with the
services available to participants who were not in ERA. The core of the ERA
Table 1 Staff, incentives, and services available to ERA (programme group) and non-ERA (control
group) customers
Feature New Deal Target Groups WTC
ERA Non-ERA ERA Non-ERA
(Programme) (Control) (Programme) (Control)
Job coaching staff
• PA: Personal Adviser
• ASA: Advancement Support Adviser ASA PA ASA
Eligible for New Deal pre-employment services ✓ ✓
• Job placement assistance
• Advice on training and increasing skills
Eligible for in-work support ✓ ✓
• Coaching on advancement in current position
and/or finding a better job
• Rapid re-employment services when necessary
Eligible for in-work bonuses ✓ ✓
• Retention Bonus: Up to six payments of £400
for each period when customers work 30 or
more hours per week for 13 out of 17 weeks
• Training Bonus: Tuition payment of up to £1,000
if training undertaken while working; if training is
successfully completed, £8 for every hour of
training, up to £1,000
Eligible to receive Adviser Discretion Fund (ADF) money ✓ ✓
• Pre-employment funds available to help customers
obtain work
Eligible to receive Emergency Discretion Fund (EDF) money ✓ ✓
• In-work funds available to help customers stay employed
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make work pay, and financial incentives to encourage training participation. These ele-
ments are described in more detail below.
2.2.1 Advisory support
Individuals assigned to the ERA programme worked with an Advancement Support
Adviser who provided job coaching for a maximum of 33 months over both pre-
employment and in-work periods. ERA participants in the WTC group who were
already working would begin receiving in-work support immediately but would still re-
ceive support for up to 33 months.
ERA was designed so that, in the pre-employment stage, advisers coached their
ERA participants to consider the advancement opportunities of a job before taking it
and to try to identify work that would be a good fit with their skills and interests.
Once in work, coaching continued in order to help participants address any continu-
ing or new barriers to their employment and to help them advance in their work. To
guide their work with participants, advisers developed a personalised Advancement
Action Plan with each of them, which set out job search, retention, and advancement
steps.
ERA advisers also had access to an Emergency Discretion Fund, which was a pool of
up to £300 per participant to avert minor financial emergencies that threatened to
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new tools, car repairs, or help with short-term childcare problems.
2.2.2 Financial incentives
In addition, the ERA programme included financial incentives designed to promote
work retention and advancement.2.2.2.1 Employment retention bonus To motivate ERA participants to enter full-time
work, and to do so earlier than they might normally have considered, ERA offered up
to six payments of £400 when participants worked 30 or more hours per week⁴ for 13
out of 17 weeks (or about 75 per cent of the time).⁵ This amounted to £2,400 for a par-
ticipant who received all six payments.⁶
Participants were required to provide evidence of their employment and hours by
showing wage slips and to come into the office to claim their retention bonus. This
contact provided another opportunity for face-to-face interaction with their adviser.2.2.2.2 Training bonus ERA participants were also eligible for financial incentives to
combine work with training. This was intended to encourage them to invest time and
effort in developing skills that might promote their long-term career progression. While
in work for at least 16 h per week, participants qualified for tuition payments of up to
£1,000 for approved courses that reflected the agreed goals in their own Advancement
Action Plans and corresponded with local labour market needs. These payments were
made directly to the training providers.
Participants who successfully completed an approved course received an additional
bonus of £8 for every hour of training completed, up to a maximum of £1,000 (or 125 h).3 The UK ERA evaluation
3.1 Random assignment
Entering into the random assignment study was voluntary for qualifying members of
the three target groups. When they came into Jobcentre Plus offices, their basic demo-
graphic information was recorded and they were informed of the possible advantages
of participating in the ERA programme. They were then invited to enter the demon-
stration ‘lottery,’ told that they had a 50 per cent chance of being selected for the
programme, and asked to sign an informed consent form in which they agreed to allow
researchers access to certain types of data about them, whether they were assigned to the
ERA programme group or to the control group.⁷ After completing an informed consent
process⁸, half of the participants were assigned randomly to the ERA programme group,
and the rest to a control group. Those in the control group could continue to receive
whatever services they were normally entitled to receive from Jobcentre Plus or could ob-
tain elsewhere in the community. Thus, control group members in the two New Deal cus-
tomer groups went on to receive regular New Deal pre-employment services but were
expected to have little regular or intensive involvement with Jobcentre Plus staff after en-
tering work. Control group members in the WTC target group would not normally enter
the New Deal programme because they were not receiving Income Support or Jobseeker’s
Allowance. Therefore, they were not offered pre- or post-employment services or
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Plus staff on their own initiative and could seek other services or training on their own.
Random assignment was successfully carried out between October 2003 and April
2005. Across all six districts, 6,787 people entered the ERA research sample from NDLP,
2,815 people entered the sample as WTC recipients, and 6,782 people entered the sample
from ND25+. As a result of random assignment, programme and control group members
within each target group shared similar characteristics, on average, and baseline balance
tests detected few statistically significant differences. This helped ensure that the control
group would provide unbiased estimates of how programme group participants would
have progressed over time had they never encountered ERA. Despite the similarities
within the programme and control members of each the three targeted groups, there were
relatively different social compositions between each of these groups, as shown in Table 2
and discussed below.⁹
NDLP group. NDLP sample members were mostly young to middle-aged women; 95 per
cent were female. Over 80 per cent were under 40, and 15 per cent were racial/ethnic mi-
norities. This generally aligned with the demographics of NDLP entrants nationwide.
NDLP sample members faced significant barriers to work. About a quarter had no
educational qualifications, just under half had reached General Certificate of Secondary
Education (GCSE) level, and fewer had A-level qualifications.¹⁰ Two-thirds lived in social
housing (housing owned by the local government or a private housing association), and
only about a quarter lived in privately owned or privately rented accommodation. Over
two-thirds did not have a driving licence or access to a vehicle, and almost two-thirds
cited barriers to work (which could include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic
skills, or other problems). Nearly half did not work at all in the 3 years before random as-
signment, and just over a quarter worked 13 months or more during this period. The chil-
dren of the NDLP sample were quite young; the youngest child of 58 per cent of the
sample was under the age of seven, and only 16 per cent of sample members had a youn-
gest child over the age of 12 at the time of randomisation.
WTC group. Almost all of the WTC sample members were women. The WTC
sample was older than the NDLP sample, as nearly half were in their 30s, and another
36 per cent were age 40 or older. As would be expected, the youngest child of members
of the WTC sample was older than that of the NDLP sample, with 62 per cent over the
age of seven and 30 per cent over the age of 12 at the time of randomisation.
The lone parents receiving WTC differed from the NDLP group in ways that under-
score the differences between groups of people who had worked more steadily and those
who had been out of work. Nearly 90 per cent of the WTC group reported working 13
months or more in the 3 years before random assignment. In the WTC group, very few
reported no work experience in the 3 years before random assignment, as they had to be
working at the time of random assignment to enter ERA.
This group also reported better qualifications than the NDLP group, with only 12 per
cent having no qualifications at all and a greater percentage having qualifications beyond a
GCSE. Over half lived in privately owned or privately rented housing, a proportion much
greater than among the NDLP sample members. They had fewer transport barriers as well;
only one-third reported no driving licence or access to a vehicle, compared with two-thirds
of the NDLP sample members. However, the WTC sample members were almost as likely
to report facing barriers to work; in their case, they seem to have overcome these obstacles.
Table 2 Demographic profile of all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005
Characteristic New Deal for Lone Parents Working Tax Credit New Deal 25 Plus
Gender (%)
Male 5.0 2.6 81.1
Female 95.0 97.4 18.9
Age (%)
Under 30 41.3 17.0 16.3
30-39 39.7 47.1 36.8
40 or older 19.0 35.9 46.9
Age of youngest child (%)a
No children 1.0 1.4 84.0
Under 7 57.8 36.8 8.9
7-11 25.4 31.8 3.0
12-16 15.3 25.9 2.3
17 or older 0.5 4.1 1.8
Race/ethnicity (%)
Ethnic minority 14.8 7.8 21.5
White 85.2 92.2 78.5
Education (highest qualification obtained)b (%)
None 23.2 12.1 36.3
GCSE 47.7 45.0 26.9
A-level 21.6 30.7 23.6
Other 7.6 12.2 13.2
Housing statusc (%)
Family 7.6 6.0 23.1
Social 66.5 37.6 45.9
Private 26.0 56.3 31.0
Number of months worked in 3 years prior to random assignment (%)
None 49.6 1.2 45.5
1-12 23.1 11.6 33.8
13+ 27.3 87.2 20.7
Cohort (%)
Early (October 2003 - May 2004) 52.1 19.1 47.8
Late (June 2004 - April 2005) 47.9 80.9 52.2
No driving licence or lack of access to vehicle (%) 67.5 33.1 77.2
Has barriers to workd (%) 65.3 68.0 62.9
Severely disadvantagede (%) 23.1 NA 20.1
Moderately disadvantagedf (%) NA 37.3 NA
Sample size 6,787 2,815 6,782
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from baseline information forms completed by DWP staff
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. Sample includes all lone parent customers
and all New Deal 25 Plus customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005
aChild’s age is asked only for children who are living with the customer
bCustomers who have General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) qualifications refers to those who have passed a
series of examinations in a variety of subjects, usually taken at age 15 or 16. Those with A-level qualifications have passed
a series of more advanced examinations usually taken around age 18 or older. Those with no qualifications have completed
neither series of examinations
cFamily housing refers to situations where the customer is living with his/her parents or other friends or relatives. Social
housing refers to housing in which the Local Authority (local government) or a private housing association is the
landlord. Private housing refers to owner-occupied housing or housing that the customer rents privately
dBarriers to work include housing, transport, childcare, health, basic skills, or other problems
eSeverely disadvantaged refers to those NDLP customers with GCSE qualifications or lower, no work in the 3 years prior
to random assignment, and at least one barrier to employment
fModerately disadvantaged refers to those WTC customers with GCSE qualifications or lower and at least one barrier to employment
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parent target groups. ND25+ sample members were largely older men—81 per cent
were male, nearly half were age 40 or older, and 84 per cent were age 30 or older.
Sixteen per cent had dependent children at home, while more had children living
elsewhere. Twenty-two per cent were ethnic minorities—a higher proportion of
ethnic minorities than either of the two lone parent groups in ERA. More than a
third had no educational qualifications at all. The largest proportion (46 per cent)
lived in social housing; 31 per cent lived in private housing. Less than a quarter of
the ND25+ sample members had a driving licence and access to a vehicle. Nearly
two-thirds cited barriers to work, 46 per cent had no work experience in the three
years before random assignment, and only 21 per cent said that they worked more
than a year during that time.3.2 Data and methods
The impact analysis relies heavily on administrative data. Employment and earnings
administrative records data were provided to DWP by Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs and maintained in DWP’s Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS)
database. Benefits receipt data available from DWP are the primary source of bene-
fits information. In addition, data are available from three waves¹¹ of a longitudinal
customer survey administered at 12, 24, and 60 months following each individual’s
date of random assignment (when they entered the study).¹² The survey data pro-
vide a basis for assessing how much ERA participants used ERA’s employment-
related services and incentives and how much participants’ receipt of training and
other services differed from that of controls (who were free to seek alternative ser-
vices on their own from Jobcentre Plus or other agencies).
The study also uses qualitative research (i.e., in-depth interviews with ERA staff
and participants), along with financial data on bonus receipt and other programme
records, to provide further insights into the experiences of operating ERA within
Jobcentre Plus, participants’ responses to the programme, and participants’ experi-
ences in work.
Results presented in this paper are based on “intent-to-treat” impact estimates.
That is, the impacts are calculated by comparing all individuals in the programme
group with all individuals assigned to the control group, regardless of whether or
how long they were engaged in UK ERA services. The impacts were regression-
adjusted using background characteristics of the sample such as prior earnings,
education, household characteristics, and relative month of random assignment.
The following equation was used to estimate the impacts of UK ERA:
Y i ¼ αþ βPi þ δXi þ εi;
where: Yj = the outcome measure for sample member i, Pi = one for programme group
members and zero for control group members, Xi = a set of background characteristics
for sample member i, εi = a random error term for sample member i, β = the estimate of
the impact of the programme on the average value of the outcome, α = the intercept of the
regression, and δ = the set of regression coefficients for the background characteristics.¹³
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4.0.0.1 Implementation results Researchers conducted multiple rounds of in-depth
qualitative interviews with both staff and programme group members from 2004
through spring 2009. These data form the bulk of the data used for the implementation
and process analyses of ERA. Those analyses also relied on weekly diaries that
Technical Advisers kept from the beginning of random assignment through June 2005,
as well as on data collected on site visits and observations they made at various points
throughout the course of ERA.
The implementation analysis found that ERA was largely implemented as designed,
although the amount and quality of retention and advancement support offered to par-
ticipants varied over time and across districts. Employed ERA participants in all three
target groups experienced substantially higher levels of advancement-related support
from Jobcentre Plus compared with employed control group members.
At the time ERA was launched, line staff and managers alike were inexperienced
in delivering an advancement-focused intervention, and the institutional incentives
under which they operated offered little encouragement to focus on advancement-
related outcomes. Not surprisingly, the agency encountered many difficulties along
the way, and the quality with which ERA was implemented varied across local
Jobcentre Plus districts, offices, and staff. However, over time and with much
effort, implementation grew stronger, and Jobcentre Plus was able to deliver the
core elements of the model.¹⁴ Overall, substantially higher proportions of working
ERA participants were engaged with Jobcentre Plus and received advancement-
related assistance while employed compared with their control group counterparts.
Data from the 2-year customer survey show that, among respondents who had
worked during the follow-up period, those in the programme group, on average,
had substantially more contact with a Jobcentre Plus adviser while working and re-
ceived more help and guidance on advancement compared with their counterparts
in the control group (see Fig. 1).¹⁵ For example, within the NDLP target group,
81 per cent of employed ERA participants had reported some in-work contact with
Jobcentre Plus staff, compared with 42 per cent of those in the control group.
Large differentials were also evident for the WTC and ND25+ samples.
The quality of the contact also differed considerably, with higher proportions of
ERA participants than control group members reporting face-to-face contact with
Jobcentre Plus staff and greater receipt of employment retention and advancement
advice. For example, among survey respondents who had worked, the proportion
who reported having received ‘help or advice on retention and advancement while
in work’ was between three and ten times greater for ERA participants than con-
trols. Together, these findings confirm that engagement with Jobcentre Plus was
much different for employed ERA participants than for employed individuals who
were not part of ERA.4.0.0.2 Advancement-focused support ERA advisers tried to promote the pro-
gramme’s advancement goals in a variety of ways. According to participants’ responses
to the 2-year survey, advancement-related coaching and advice focused most often on
the following activities: help finding education or training, determining career goals,
NDLP WTC ND25+
Had any contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work 
ERA group
Control group
Had telephone contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work 
ERA group
Control group
Had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while in work 
ERA group
Control group
Among those who had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, met with staff
at Jobcentre Plus office while in work 
ERA group
Control group
Among those who had face-to-face contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, met with staff

































Received any help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff on retention
and advancement while in work 
ERA group
Control group
Jobcentre Plus staff offered help/advice without customer requesting it 
ERA group
Control group













Fig. 1 Patterns of contact with Jobcentre Plus staff among customers who worked within 2 years after
random assignment. SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys. NOTE:
Comparisons are non-experimental since they were calculated over a portion of the sample. Statistical tests
were not performed
Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 12 of 32increasing work hours, and getting a better job (Table 3). Less common were: support
in getting a promotion, negotiating better job terms, and negotiating a pay rise.
ERA advisers recognised that the three target groups faced different types of
employment challenges and often had different views towards advancement. In
general, staff believed that the two lone parent groups (NDLP and WTC) were
more responsive to ERA than the long-term unemployed group (ND25+). However,
they also acknowledged some important differences within each target group.
Lone parents in the WTC programme group were already in work and had
stronger work histories on the whole. Thus, they were less likely to have job reten-
tion problems and were more receptive to exploring advancement opportunities.
Indeed, much of the in-work support advisers provided to WTC participants fo-
cused on meeting the progression goals set out in their individual Advancement
Action Plans.
ND25+ participants had the lowest rates of in-work support among the three
ERA programme groups. About a quarter of those who were working said on the
2-year survey that they had no contact with Jobcentre Plus staff while they were
employed. In the qualitative interviews, ERA advisers reported great difficulty en-
gaging these participants. They suggested a number of reasons, including the fact
Table 3 Receipt of in-work help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff within 2 years after random
assignment among customers who worked













While in work, received help or advice dealing
with personal or family problems that made job
retention hard (%)
21.4 6.7 12.9 1.6 6.1 4.9
While in work, received help or advice dealing with
problems at work (%)
13.2 3.8 7.9 0.8 10.7 4.4
While in work, received any help or advice on (%)
Getting job with better pay or conditions 31.9 9.4 47.7 3.4 21.0 6.1
Increasing hours of work 30.3 9.0 52.8 2.5 15.3 5.0
Negotiating a pay rise 5.0 1.2 7.4 0.4 6.6 0.8
Negotiating better job terms, e.g., more
convenient hours
11.7 2.9 11.0 1.3 6.3 2.5
Getting a promotion in present work 11.9 1.5 15.0 0.9 7.5 -0.2
Getting a more permanent job or contract 14.7 4.0 15.9 1.4 11.3 3.8
Working out long-term career goals 32.5 6.7 50.0 2.3 23.6 6.1
Finding an training or education course 44.5 9.6 65.1 3.1 34.5 10.3
Other type of help 11.6 3.4 19.3 1.3 7.6 2.8
Any in-work help/advice 61.3 18.7 75.2 6.9 45.8 13.0
Sample size 904 782 1,066 1,009 190 203
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and 24-month customer surveys
NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences
Comparisons are non-experimental since they were calculated over a portion of the sample. Statistical tests were
not performed
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feelings about Jobcentre Plus, a greater ethos of self-reliance, and less awareness of
available in-work support. The advisers believed that, on the whole, participants
with a history of long-term unemployment were more interested in securing a
stable, secure job as opposed to advancing in work. However, there were reports of
some participants in this group becoming more receptive to post-employment
support after settling into their jobs.
4.0.0.3 Receipt of the retention bonus The employment retention bonus was a
central feature of the ERA model. According to financial payment records
(Table 4), 45 per cent of WTC participants received an ERA retention bonus,
which was higher than the rates for the NDLP and ND25+ groups (33 per cent
and 35 per cent, respectively). WTC participants also received more payments.
This pattern is consistent with the WTC group’s greater overall attachment to
the labour force. It is possible that some people who were eligible for the bonus
did not claim it. ERA advisers who were interviewed noted that some participants
felt there was a ‘catch’ associated with the receipt of the bonus and were there-
fore suspicious of the extra money. Some lone parents were unsure what impact
the bonus would have on their WTC. Some ND25+ participants may have fore-
gone the bonus because they were reluctant to engage with Jobcentre Plus once
they had found work. In addition, evidence from qualitative interviews revealed
that some participants were simply not aware that they were eligible.
Table 4 Receipt of ERA employment retention bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC ND25+
Ever received bonus (%) 32.9 44.6 34.8
Average number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses 3.8 4.0 3.7
Number of bonuses received among customers with any bonuses (%)
One 15.3 11.3 18.2
Two 13.3 12.4 12.3
Three 14.4 11.1 11.1
Four 14.6 13.3 15.7
Five 20.0 30.1 22.7
Six 22.3 21.9 20.1
Sample size 3,365 1,415 3,424
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data
NOTE: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005
Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 14 of 324.0.0.4 Receipt of training bonuses According to financial payment records, WTC
programme group participants took advantage of training opportunities more than any
other group during ERA. Their rate of receipt of training fees and the completion
bonus was at least double that of the other target groups. About 34 per cent of all
WTC participants received assistance with training fees, compared with 16 per cent of
NDLP participants and 11 per cent of ND25+ participants (see Table 5). AverageTable 5 ERA participants’ receipt of ERA training fee assistance and training completion bonuses
Outcome NDLP WTC ND25+
Training/tuition fee assistance
Received tutition fee assistance (%) 15.5 33.8 10.8
Average number of payments received among participants with any payments 2.0 2.3 1.8
Number of payments received among participants with any payments (%)
One 54.7 47.1 58.0
Two 21.6 21.3 23.6
Three 10.9 13.8 10.6
Four or more 12.8 17.8 7.9
Average amount of each payment among participants with any payments (£) 383 291 431
Average total amount of payments among participants with any payments (£) 579 510 616
Training completion bonus
Received bonus (%) 14.1 34.1 7.4
Average number of bonuses received among participants with any bonuses 2.0 2.2 1.6
Number of bonuses received among participants with any bonuses (%)
One 55.3 48.1 65.5
Two 22.7 25.3 18.4
Three 11.6 12.9 10.2
Four or more 10.5 13.7 5.9
Average amount of each bonus among participants with any bonuses (£) 394 402 345
Average total amount of bonuses among participants with any bonuses (£) 586 633 492
Sample size 3,365 1,415 3,424
SOURCE: MDRC calculations primarily from DWP financial incentives data
NOTE: The sample for this table consists of all those randomly assigned to the ERA programme group between October
2003 and April 2005
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in the ND25+ group to £579 and £510, respectively, for working lone parents in the
NDLP and WTC groups. WTC participants were more likely than the NDLP and
ND25+ groups to receive training completion bonuses and were more likely to receive
more than one such bonus.
As noted previously, some ERA advisers more actively promoted the training incen-
tives towards the end of the programme, and this strategy is reflected in the financial
payment records. Of participants who received training-related payments, about a third
in the NDLP group, a fifth in the WTC group, and two-fifths in the ND25+ group
received training fee payments for the first time within their last nine months of eligi-
bility. Similarly, about two-fifths of NDLP bonus recipients, about a quarter of the
WTC bonus recipients, and approximately a third of ND25+ bonus recipients received
the training completion bonus for the first time in the last nine months.4.1 Core economic impact results
4.1.1 ERA’s economic impacts for lone parents in the NDLP group
For NDLP participants, balancing continuous employment with family responsibilities
was typically the most immediate priority, with advancement a more distant goal. This
created an important challenge for ERA. Because these lone parents were new to the
labour market, they tended to want time to adjust to the new routines of working and bal-
ancing job and family responsibilities before focusing on advancement. And while some
were interested in full-time work, others were not because of their family circumstances.
Nonetheless, ERA increased this group’s likelihood of working full time, at least early on.
ERA increased NDLP participants’ employment and earnings in the short term, pri-
marily by increasing their likelihood of working full time. However, these effects faded
after participants’ enrollment in the programme ended. Table 6 shows the impacts of
ERA on key economic outcomes for each target group. For NDLP lone parents, who
were not employed when they began ERA, ERA increased employment and earnings
within the first 2 years, but the effects faded thereafter. ERA also increased earnings in
the first full tax year after participants’ enrollment (tax year 2005–2006) by an esti-
mated £308, a statistically significant gain of about nine per cent over the control group
average. (The earnings outcomes for each group are averaged over all sample members
in the group, whether or not they worked; the estimates do not refer to earnings per
worker.) The impact was smaller in later tax years, and the cumulative effect on
earnings over the four tax years for which data were analysed (2005–2006 through
2008–2009)¹⁶ is not statistically significant.
Earnings effects can arise due to an increase in the likelihood and duration of employ-
ment, hours worked, or wage rates. The fact that the earnings effect in 2005–2006, in per-
centage terms, was about double the employment effect in that same year suggests that
the increase in earnings was driven in part by ERA group members working more hours
or receiving higher wages.¹⁷ According to data from the 2-year customer survey, ERA in-
creased the proportion of NDLP participants who worked full time, probably in response
to the programme’s retention bonus, which rewarded only full-time work. Data from the
60-month survey, compared with earlier surveys, indicate that this effect did not
persist, as the control group increasingly worked full time and closed the gap.
Table 6 Effects of ERA on employment, earnings, and benefits within 5 years after random assignment, New Deal for Lone Parents, Working Tax Credit, and New Deal 25 Plus target groups


























Year 1 57.1 56.5 0.6 1.0 77.0 76.6 0.4 0.6 37.3 35.4 1.9* 5.3
Year 2 57.8 55.6 2.2* 3.9 74.1 73.4 0.8 1.0 36.3 32.7 3.6*** 11.0
Year 3 53.7 53.8 -0.2 -0.3 71.2 69.9 1.3 1.8 34.6 32.5 2.1* 6.6
Year 4 53.2 54.0 -0.8 -1.5 71.3 70.1 1.2 1.8 35.0 32.1 2.9*** 9.1
Year 5 52.9 53.9 -1.0 -1.8 68.6 68.2 0.3 0.5 32.8 30.9 1.9* 6.0
Years 1-5 79.0 79.0 -0.1 -0.1 88.1 86.8 1.3 1.5 57.3 55.1 2.2* 4.0
Average earnings (£)
2005-2006 tax year 3,862 3,554 308** 8.7 7,069 6,667 402** 6.0 3,070 2,758 312** 11.3
2006-2007 tax year 4,032 3,883 150 3.9 7,408 7,071 337 4.8 3,447 3,104 342** 11.0
2007-2008 tax year 4,387 4,271 116 2.7 7,502 7,555 -53 -0.7 3,692 3,228 464*** 14.4
2008-2009 tax year 4,999 5,033 -35 -0.7 8,636 8,401 234 2.8 3,954 3,591 363** 10.1
2005-2009 tax years, 4-year earnings 17,280 16,742 538 3.2 30,615 29,695 921 3.1 14,162 12,681 1,481** 11.7
Average total amount of benefitsa received (£)
Year 1 2,915 3,055 -140** -4.6 190 201 -11 -5.4 2,359 2,406 -48 -2.0
Year 2 2,000 2,130 -130** -6.1 218 221 -3 -1.4 1,457 1,581 -124*** -7.8
Year 3 1,663 1,773 -110* -6.2 254 241 13 5.3 1,244 1,358 -115*** -8.4
Year 4 1,458 1,542 -84 -5.4 243 220 23 10.3 1,038 1,099 -61* -5.6
Year 5 1,314 1,349 -35 -2.6 285 266 19 7.1 970 1,048 -78** -7.5
Years 1-5 9,349 9,848 -499** -5.1 1,190 1,149 40 3.5 7,067 7,493 -426*** -5.7
SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment and benefits receipt records
NOTES: Estimates were regression-adjusted using ordinary least squares, controlling for pre-random assignment characteristics of sample members
Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. Statistical significance levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent
Includes all customers randomly assigned between October 2003 and April 2005














Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 17 of 32There is no clear evidence that ERA boosted NDLP participants’ employment retention
rather than employment per se, or that it increased their progression in work over the
course of the follow-up period (relative to the control group). However, it did encourage
them to go into full-time work sooner than they might otherwise have done, which has al-
ways been a major part of successive governments’ policies towards lone parents.
ERA caused a small reduction in NDLP participants’ receipt of Income Support payments.
Lone parents in the NDLP group all claimed Income Support at the time of random assign-
ment. ERA reduced participants’ number of months on Income Support within the first two
follow-up years, but not thereafter (result not shown in table). ERA produced a longer-lasting
effect on the amount of benefits participants received. Here, significant reductions were seen
in each of follow-up years 1 through 3. Over all 5 years, those in the ERA group received
almost £500 less in cumulative Income Support payments than those in the control group,
a statistically significant reduction of five per cent relative to the control group average.
The subgroup analysis found that ERA had substantial and longer-lasting positive impacts
on earnings for NDLP lone parents with higher educational qualifications (i.e., those with
A-level or equivalent qualifications¹⁸) at the time they entered the programme. It increased
their total average earnings over the four tax years 2005–2009 by about £3,500, a gain of
15 per cent over the control group average. At the same time, ERA had no earnings effects
for those with lower qualifications. One interpretation of this finding is that lone parents
who were unemployed but possessed better skills had more ‘reserve capacity’ to obtain and
manage full-time work. ERA’s incentives and support may have motivated and helped them
make more effort to act on that capacity than they would have made on their own.
4.1.2 ERA’s economic impacts for the WTC group
Of the three target groups, WTC lone parents (who were already employed part time
when they entered ERA) most fully embraced ERA’s advancement goals. In part,
because of the way they were recruited to ERA—through a general community out-
reach effort rather than as part of the normal New Deal intake process within
Jobcentre Plus—the WTC participants were a more selected, advantaged group than
the NDLP and ND25+ target groups when they began the programme. Not only were
they already working, they had better educational qualifications and, compared with
the NDLP lone parents, were somewhat older and had older children. They joined ERA
with the explicit intention of improving their current position in the labour market and
were generally more receptive to advancement support and more interested in steady,
full time work. This group was the most likely to receive ERA’s retention bonuses.
Overall, ERA had no significant impact on the percentage of WTC participants who
worked in any given month, but it increased their likelihood of working full time and their
earnings. The earnings effect faded after their participation in the programme ended.
Figure 2 shows monthly employment rates for the WTC control group. Nearly all
members of the control group worked at some point during the 5-year follow-up
period, reflecting the fact that the tax credit is conditioned on working. (The true em-
ployment rate may have been somewhat higher; as previously noted, administrative re-
cords data do not capture all employment.) Furthermore, the proportion in work
remained fairly stable at a fairly high rate, usually exceeding 60 per cent. Nonetheless,
this rate is lower than the proportion ever in work during the follow-up period, indicat-
ing some movement in and out of the labour market even among this group. Because
ERA group =              Control group =                             
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Fig. 2 ERA group and control group employment rate trends over the first 5 years after random assignment,
Working Tax Credit target group. SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study
employment records. NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences.
Two-tailed t-tests were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. A
white diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. A black
diamond on the axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level.
These figures include some months before the time of random assignment. Months before random assignment
are indicated with a negative sign
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expected that ERA would increase their likelihood of working during the follow-up
period. More relevant was whether it would increase the consistency of their employ-
ment, their likelihood of working full time, and their advancement and earnings.
ERA’s main effect for the WTC group was a short-term increase in earnings. As
Table 6 shows, the programme increased earnings in the 2005–2006 tax year by an esti-
mated £402, a statistically significant gain of about six per cent above the control group
average. However, the earnings impacts were not statistically significant in later years,
or for the follow-up period overall.
The short-term earnings gain was largely due to ERA participants working more
hours. According to data from the 2-year customer survey, ERA increased the percent-
age of participants working full time by nearly 13 percentage points above the control
group rate. However, this difference shrank to seven percentage points over time as the
control group caught up, which may explain why the longer-term earnings impacts,
though still positive, are not statistically significant.
ERA had no effects on the receipt of out-of-work benefits or in-work tax credits among
the WTC group. At the time of random assignment, WTC participants were working 16
to 29 h a week and were not eligible to claim an out-of-work benefit, such as Income Sup-
port, at that time. Instead, they were receiving tax credit payments conditioned on work.
Because ERA did not affect this group’s employment rates or trends, it also had no effect
on its receipt of benefits or tax credits.
4.1.3 ERA’s economic impacts for the ND25+ group
The mostly male ND25+ group was generally the most disadvantaged and most diffi-
cult to engage of the three target groups ERA served. Given these challenges, it is
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ND25+ group than it did for the two lone parent groups.
ERA increased ND25+ participants’ employment rates and earnings, and these posi-
tive effects persisted through the end of the study, suggesting that the ERA model can
work for a highly disadvantaged population (see Table 6). ERA generated modest posi-
tive employment impacts for ND25+ participants in all five follow-up years, peaking at
a statistically significant 3.6 percentage points during the second year, an increase of
about 11 per cent relative to the control group average. Positive effects on employment
continued even after participants’ enrollment in the programme ended.
Figure 3 shows that there are positive impacts on employment for almost all of the
months of the follow-up period, with about three-fifths of them being statistically sig-
nificant. While the impacts faded somewhat late in year 3, they re-emerged in year 4.
Though the employment impacts are not statistically significant in the last couple of
months of year 5, the balance of evidence still strongly suggests that ERA had a long-
run impact on employment for the ND25+ group. Further analysis found that most of
ERA’s effect on employment among the ND25+ group was due to increases in move-
ment into employment rather than increases in employment retention (Dorsett, 2014).
ERA’s earnings impacts for this group are substantial and statistically significant in
each year, totaling £1,481 over the four tax years for which earnings data are available.
This represents a gain of 12 per cent above the control group average. In percentage
terms, the earnings impacts are larger than the employment impacts, suggesting the
possibility that there was also an impact on either hours of work, hourly wage rates, orERA group =              Control group =                             
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Fig. 3 ERA group and control group employment rate trends over the first 5 years after random assignment, New
Deal 25 Plus target group. SOURCE: MDRC calculations from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study employment
records. NOTES: Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in calculating sums and differences. Two-tailed t-tests
were applied to differences between outcomes for the ERA group and the control group. A white diamond on the
axis indicates that the impact is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. A black diamond on the axis indicates
that the impact is statistically significant at the 5 per cent or 1 per cent level. These figures include some months
before the time of random assignment. Months before random asisgnment are indicated with a negative sign
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2010–2011 tax year, though impacts on earnings faded to nonsignificance.¹⁹
The sustained impacts of ERA for the ND25+ group are especially noteworthy in
light of the fact that this group was so severely disadvantaged and so difficult to employ
normally, as suggested by outcomes for the control group. Only about one-third of
ND25+ controls worked in any given year during the follow-up period, and just over
half (55 per cent) had ever worked during that 5-year period. (In contrast, 79 per cent
of the NDLP controls and 87 per cent of the WTC controls had worked at some point
during the follow-up period.)²⁰ The fact that ERA was able to produce impacts for this
long term unemployed group suggests that it may be possible to use financial incentives
to promote reemployment of the long term unemployed to overcome any scarring ef-
fects of being out of the labour market, at least for some. This has important implica-
tions for several countries which are still struggling with long term unemployment and
implies that the policies such as reemployment bonuses may be effective.
ERA reduced receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance among the ND25+ group. ND25+ partici-
pants had been receiving cash benefits in the form of Jobseeker’s Allowance when they en-
tered ERA. By the second year of follow-up, ERA had begun to reduce their reliance on that
benefit. Over all five follow-up years, ERA reduced total average benefits received by a statis-
tically significant £426 per ERA member, which is six per cent of the control group average.
4.2 The costs and benefits of ERA
The evaluation’s cost-benefit analysis offers a way to summarise the net economic gains and
losses that ERA produced, taking into account its combined effects on a wide variety of
measures and the likely longer-term value of those effects after the end of the evaluation’s
5-year follow-up period. It considers gains and losses not only from the perspective of par-
ticipants themselves, but also from the standpoint of the Exchequer (and, thus, taxpayers),
which paid for the programme, and for society as a whole (which simply reflects the results
for the other two perspectives combined). These results are show in Table 7.Box 1: Cost-Benefit Analysis Approach
In brief, the following steps were used to conduct the cost-benefit analysis:
Step 1. The impact analysis was conducted to estimate most of the key benefits and costs, such as ERA’s
impacts on earnings and on various benefit payments, including Income Support and Jobseeker’s
Allowance payments, during the observation period.
Step 2. The impact estimates were used to populate a spreadsheet.
Step 3. The values in the spreadsheet were all converted to 2005–2006 lb using the Consumer Price
Index in order to adjust for inflation.
Step 4. As described in Section 7.4.2 of Hendra et al. (2011), formulas were applied to the impacts
estimates, especially the estimated impact on earnings, in order to determine some of the remaining
benefits and costs listed in the table—for example, ERA’s effects on indirect taxes, National Insurance
Contributions, and pensions.
Step 5. Based on the estimated impacts during the last year of the observation period and the
assumed decay rates appearing in Hendra et al. (2011) the benefits and costs during the projection
period were predicted. These decay rates were based on the patterns in impacts over time.
Step 6. The benefits and costs were discounted to convert them to their value in the first year.
Step 7. The discounted benefit and cost values for each year during the time horizon were summed.
Table 7 Summary of ERA’s cost-benefit results, by target group
Net present value (£)
Target group Participants Exchequer Society
New Deal for Lone Parents -37 -124 -161
Working Tax Credit 230 -1,836 -1,606
New Deal 25 Plus 726 1,816 2,542
SOURCES: MDRC calculations
NOTE: Benefits refers to Income Support for New Deal for Lone Parents customers, a combination of Income Support and
Jobseeker’s Allowance for Working Tax Credit customers, and Jobseeker’s Allowance for New Deal 25 Plus customers
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for participants and a positive return on the government’s investment. ERA markedly
increased the net incomes of the ND25+ group. Using one set of assumptions to esti-
mate cost-benefit results over a 10-year time period, the analysis found that partici-
pants’ average net income increased by about £725 per participant. (This estimate is
spread over all programme group members, whether or not they worked or received
ERA services; those who were actually affected by ERA would, of course, have
gained more.) ERA also returned a little over £1,800 to the Exchequer for every
participant enrolled in the programme. This represents a return of £4.01 for every
£1 it spent on ERA. The results from the overall perspective of society as a whole
were positive as well.²¹
For the NDLP group, ERA had very small effects from all cost-benefit perspec-
tives. On average, ERA resulted in a small loss in the net income of NDLP partici-
pants and small losses for the government’s budget and society as a whole.
However, a separate cost-benefit analysis for the NDLP subgroup with A-level and
equivalent qualifications suggests that, for this subgroup, ERA increased the dispos-
able income of participants while producing savings for the Exchequer. At the
same time, the opposite effects are likely to have occurred as a result of ERA for
NDLP participants with lower qualifications.
The net cost of operating ERA was greater for the WTC group than for the NDLP
and ND25+ groups, but this greater expenditure did not yield a better return on the
government’s investment or substantial net income gains for participants. For the WTC
group, ERA cost over twice as much per participant to operate than for the two New
Deal groups. This is largely because the WTC group had a longer post-
employment phase, which lasted the full 33 months of the programme. In con-
trast, the two New Deal groups received pre-employment services during the first
nine months or so, which cost about the same as they did for the controls; in
other words, the added cost of ERA for the first phase of the programme was
almost negligible.
ERA appears to have modestly increased the disposable incomes of WTC partici-
pants. But because it was costly to operate, it produced a net loss for the Exchequer,
and as a consequence, an overall loss from the societal perspective.²²4.3 The relative importance of adviser support, incentives, and training
The results of the UK ERA Demonstration have important bearing on key policy
issues, including the relative importance of incentives, support, and training, the
Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 22 of 32professionalization of the case manager role, and the overall benefits of the ERA
approach to breaking the low pay, no pay cycle.
Both ERA’s in-work support from advisers and its employment retention bonus may
have contributed to the programme’s positive labour market effects. All of the elements
of ERA were offered as a package, and this makes it very difficult to determine whether
some components of the intervention were more effective than others. For example, by
design, participants were expected to speak with staff about advancement issues each
time they received a retention bonus. However, the intensity with which local Jobcentre
Plus offices implemented each of these components varied, and the local offices did not
necessarily implement each component equally well.
In one attempt to shed light on the relative contributions to the programme’s success
of incentives versus in-work support, the evaluation included a non-experimental
cross-office study using data on the NDLP sample. These results are summarised in
Table 8.²³ The table presents results for two outcomes, welfare receipt and employment
status, during and after the programme was operating.²⁴ As indicated in this table, sev-
eral office characteristics were found to be associated with greater impacts of the ERA
demonstration on the NDLP sample, both during and after the programme ended.
ERA’s main design feature was to extend the NDLP programme by providing help after
employment was obtained. The cross-office analysis found that such retention services
can lead to additional impacts beyond those obtained under the New Deal programme
and can help individuals achieve economic self-sufficiency (by spending fewer months
on welfare and more months employed). Offices that assigned more caseworkers to
ERA participants tended to be more successful in reducing time spent on welfare. Of-
fices that emphasised in-work advancement and in-work support more generally
tended to deliver stronger effects of ERA as did those offices where awareness levels of
the employment retention bonus were higher. On the other hand, offices that empha-
sised human capital investment tended to have weaker employment impacts.
The interquartile ranges of the impacts across offices are also presented in Table 8.²⁵
These ranges are important because, in practice, few of the programme-control group
differences in receiving the various services were very large, so the effect translates to
modest variation across offices in the impact of the services. In interpreting the results
of the cross-office study, it is important to understand that while certain office charac-
teristics may be statistically significant in explaining programme impacts, lack of vari-
ation in these characteristics across offices may lead to only a small estimated variation
in these impacts across offices.²⁶ Thus, for example, while the results indicate the im-
portance of conveying information about the financial rewards available to lone parent
ERA participants who maintain employment, there was not much variation in the ac-
tual conveying of this information across offices, so it is associated with only modest
variation in programme impacts across offices.
Table 8 shows that in offices where all of the advisers were working with ERA partici-
pants, the average programme group member spent 3 fewer months on welfare than in
offices where no advisers were working with ERA participants. To put it another way,
an individual in an office with a 10 percentage point higher proportion of advisers
working with ERA participants will have .3 fewer months on welfare than an individual
in an office where the same proportion of advisers worked with ERA participants and
control group members (NDLP recipients). The information on interquartile ranges is
Table 8 Effects of office characterisitics on office programme impacts over five years
Coefficient Standard Error Interquartile Range
Across Offices
Months on IS, years 1 to 3
Grand mean impact of ERA (β0) -1.52*** 0.35 -2.20 to -0.24
Proportion of advisers working with ERA customers -3.03* 1.62 0.30 to -0.25
Proportion of customers advised to think long-term 0.17 2.12 -0.02 to 0.02
Proportion of customers receiving help finding education
course
3.62 2.27 -0.68 to 0.42
Proportion of customers receiving help with in-work
advancement
-2.15 1.70 0.17 to -0.18
Proportion of customers receiving support while working -3.49*** 1.02 0.60 to -0.51
Proportion of ERA customers aware of retention bonuses -9.42*** 2.03 0.55 to -0.50
Months on IS, years 4 to 5
Grand mean impact of ERA (β0) 0.04 0.06 -0.92 to 0.84
Proportion of advisers working with ERA customers -2.50** 1.05 0.25 to -0.21
Proportion of customers advised to think long-term -0.23 1.83 0.03 to -0.03
Proportion of customers receiving help finding education
course
1.96 2.02 -0.37 to 0.23
Proportion of customers receiving help with in-work
advancement
0.43 1.89 -0.03 to 0.04
Proportion of customers receiving support while working -1.64* 0.90 0.28 to -0.24
Proportion of ERA customers aware of retention bonuses -6.43*** 0.50 0.38 to -0.34
Months Employed, years 1 to 3
Grand mean impact of ERA (β0) 0.76** 0.03 -0.63 to 2.12
Proportion of advisers working with ERA customers 0.53 2.29 -0.05 to 0.04
Proportion of customers advised to think long-term -0.11 2.49 0.01 to -0.01
Proportion of customers receiving help finding education
course
-4.06** 1.71 0.76 to -0.47
Proportion of customers receiving help with in-work
advancement
7.68** 3.25 -0.60 to 0.63
Proportion of customers receiving support while working 3.23* 1.75 -0.56 to 0.47
Proportion of ERA customers aware of retention bonuses 8.41 7.58 -0.49 to 0.45
Months Employed, years 4 to 5
Grand mean impact of ERA (β0) 0.12 0.02 -0.71 to 0.73
Proportion of advisers working with ERA customers 1.79 1.56 -0.18 to 0.15
Proportion of customers advised to think long-term 1.09 1.67 -0.13 to 0.12
Proportion of customers receiving help finding education
course
-2.33** 1.06 0.44 to -0.27
Proportion of customers receiving help with in-work
advancement
1.67 1.52 -0.13 to 0.14
Proportion of customers receiving support while working 3.73*** 1.17 -0.64 to 0.54
Proportion of ERA customers aware of retention bonuses 4.87 4.49 -0.28 to 0.26
Interquartile range is the predicted impact from the 25th percentile of the office characteristic to the 75th percentile
*Significant at 10 per cent level; **Significant at 5 per cent level; ***Significant at 1 per cent level
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receiving this kind of help were very large, so the effect translates to only about a .6
month interquartile range across offices in the impact of the advisers on welfare receipt.
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office analysis are also interesting in another regard. While the overall impact of ERA
on welfare and employment status 4 to 5 years post-randomization was not statistically
significant, the study finds that this masks significant variation of impacts across offices,
some being positive and some negative. This suggests that, in addition to focusing on
overall impacts, which is typically done in employment and training demonstrations,
policy evaluation should, where possible, pay attention to implementation procedures
across offices where the programme is being conducted. Rather than concluding a pol-
icy to be ineffective, the type of approach presented in the cross-office study may offer
a means of learning from those with positive impacts in order to refine policy and, in
time, raise overall effectiveness.
ERA increased participation in training courses, especially for the WTC target
group. However, these impacts appear unrelated to ERA’s effects on labour market
outcomes. Analyses comparing ERA’s impacts across target groups, subgroups, and
offices suggest that any increase ERA caused in training did not lead to long-term
earnings gains. For example, even though ERA increased participation in training for
the NDLP group and, especially, the WTC group, it did not produce lasting earnings
impacts for either of them. In addition, ERA’s impacts on earnings were no larger for
subgroups that experienced larger impacts on training than for those with smaller im-
pacts or no impacts on training.
Figure 4 shows ERA’s impacts on course-taking in years 1–2 and impacts on
total 4-year earnings across the educational qualifications subgroups. The analysis
focuses on training in the first 2 years in order to provide a sufficient amount of
time for training to translate into advancement gains. It is reasonable to expect,
however, that not all training courses are equally relevant for advancement. In
particular, courses specific to occupations in which people currently work or to
which they are hoping to transfer would be expected to lead more quickly to economic
advancement. For the purposes of this analysis, courses were categorised as ‘trade-specific’
if they were relevant to specific occupations, such as nursing or business.
To facilitate the comparison of impacts, all impacts are expressed in ‘percentage
change’ terms (to do this, the impact was divided by the control group level and
multiplied by 100). The purpose of Fig. 4 is to measure whether impacts on
training and qualifications correlate with impacts on earnings. For example, if sub-
groups that experienced a larger-than-average impact on training also had a larger-
than-average impact on earnings, this would suggest that the additional training
may have contributed to the larger earnings impacts. This analysis avoids problems
with endogeneity by identifying subgroups defined at baseline (which are exogenous
to the treatment) which had higher than average participation in training. However,
an important caveat to this analysis is that ERA did more than incentivise and
support training; thus, the contribution of other features of the programme cannot
be ruled out. However, the absence of a correspondence between training impacts
and earnings impacts would suggest that ERA’s impacts on training did not pay off
in the labour market or that labour market gains were achieved without increases
in training.
Generally, Fig. 4 suggests that increasing course-taking alone did not lead to increases











All customers Qualifications: A-level or
above
Qualifications: GCSE Qualifications: None
NDLP group Took any courses
Took trade-specific courses
Obtained any training qualification















All customers Qualifications: A-level or
above
Qualifications: GCSE Qualifications: None
WTC group Took any courses
Took trade-specific courses
Obtained any training qualification
Earnings 2005-2009 tax years
Fig. 4 Percentage change impacts of ERA on training during years 1–2, and cumulative earnings from
2005–2009 by baseline level of education subgroups. SOURCE: MDRC calculations from ERA 12- and
24-month customer surveys and Work and Pensions Longitudinal Survey earnings records. NOTE: To
facilitate the comparison of impacts, all impacts in this figure are expressed in 'percentage change' terms.
To do this, the impact was divided by the control group level and multiplied by 100. Statistical significance
levels are indicated as: * = 10 per cent; ** = 5 per cent; and *** = 1 per cent
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is partly evident from the experiences of members of the NDLP subgroup who entered
the programme with A-level qualifications. As discussed elsewhere, earnings impacts
for this subgroup were more than 15 per cent above those of the control group, which
is the largest increase among the subgroups shown in Fig. 4. However, those with A-
levels did not experience increases in any of the education and training measures
shown in the figure. A closer examination of the course-taking impacts for this sub-
group reveals very few effects of ERA on any course-taking outcomes. Therefore, it
seems likely that the impacts for this subgroup reflect the effectiveness of other ERA
components, such as the employment retention bonus or adviser advancement support.
This subgroup had relatively high take-up of the employment retention bonus, suggest-
ing that the retention bonus was more important than the training support and training
incentives, at least for this subgroup.
Results for NDLP participants who entered ERA with GCSEs also point to a lack of
correspondence between increases in training and increases in earnings. This group
experienced statistically significant impacts on taking any courses in general and in
taking trade-specific courses, but no effect on longer-term earnings. A similar pattern
is evident across the full WTC group, as well as each of the WTC subgroups, shown in
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statistically significant increases in key training outcomes in years 1–2. Some of the im-
pacts on course-taking were quite large in percentage-change terms. For example,
among WTC group members with GCSE qualifications, ERA increased trade-specific
course-taking by over 40 per cent. Despite these large effects on course-taking, none of
the subgroups experienced a statistically significant increase in earnings.
5 Discussion
ERA’s pattern of results for lone parents, where earnings impacts emerge early on and
then decline after the incentives ended, is broadly consistent with the pattern found for
other programmes in the US and Canada that used financial incentives for similar pop-
ulations. As mentioned in the introduction, several other randomised control trials in
the US and Canada tested interventions that offered financial work incentives—either
alone or in combination with job placement and other pre-employment services—to
unemployed lone parents receiving cash benefits similar to Income Support. Although
important exceptions exist, these programmes, like ERA, produced early positive
impacts on employment and earnings but saw their impacts fade over time after the
work incentives had ended (Michalopoulos, 2005).
While the results in ERA are broadly similar to other employment focused incentive
programmes, they are somewhat weaker and faded somewhat earlier than many of the
programmes.²⁷ For illustration, ERA’s labour market impacts for out of work lone par-
ents are smaller than those produced by a fairly similar programme in the US. The
most comparable programme to the UK ERA programme is an employment retention
and advancement programme in the US state of Texas, which was evaluated as part of
the US ERA demonstration and shared many similarities with the UK ERA model. It
included pre-employment and post-employment support for unemployed lone parents
and offered financial incentives for full-time work. The cash value of the Texas incen-
tive was roughly comparable with ERA’s retention bonus, although it was paid monthly
rather than every four months. Like ERA, the Texas programme was tested with a
random assignment design, and both the programme and control groups received pre-
employment services, such as those offered by the New Deal programme.
Two of the three pilot cities in the Texas study fully implemented the post-
employment features of the model, and these two cities produced larger cumulative
earnings gains than UK ERA generated for the NDLP group. Why the Texas
programme’s effects were larger is uncertain. One speculation is that this may be partly
because in Texas, the size of the retention bonus relative to the local minimum wage
and to the amount of benefits available to non-working lone parents was considerably
greater than in Britain so that full-time work would ‘pay’ more. This may have in-
creased the power of the Texas incentives to make a more enduring change in partici-
pants’ labour market behaviour. Another possibility is that the higher minimum wage
in the UK may have constrained labour market conditions, particularly for lower skilled
women. This might explain why the effects were stronger for more educated partici-
pants (who likely earn more than the minimum wage). However evidence on the
employment depressing effects of the minimum wage in the UK is unclear.
To be more effective, advancement-focused interventions like ERA may require
advisers to have more expertise on industry-specific job opportunities, local knowledge,
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kind of programme for Jobcentre Plus. Consequently, its managers and line staff, who
were expected to deliver an innovative advancement-focused intervention, faced a
steep learning curve. In addition, they had to operate the intervention within a
Jobcentre Plus environment that placed a high priority on job placement and
offered little reward to staff for focusing on advancement-related outcomes for
people who got jobs. However, as ERA advisers acquired more experience, they
grew more adept and confident in helping employed participants develop and pur-
sue advancement goals, such as moving up to better positions with their same em-
ployers, switching jobs, and finding training courses to improve their skills.
At the same time, ERA advisory staff functioned as employment ‘generalists’.
They offered participants general advice and guidance on adapting to work, en-
couraged them to consider seeking full-time work, helped them address issues of
balancing work and family life, advised them on seeking promotions and finding
better jobs, and urged them to enroll in training courses in whatever areas inter-
ested them. However, ERA advisers were not expected to have in-depth knowledge
of particular occupations or industries or expertise on the career ladders and train-
ing requirements for jobs in those areas. Nor were they expected to steer partici-
pants assertively towards particular occupations known to offer real advancement
opportunities. They were also not positioned to connect participants who had
trained in particular occupational areas with relevant employers who were hiring
people with the new skills those participants had acquired. These limitations might
have undermined the benefits of the extra participation in training that ERA
caused. Perhaps future advancement-focused programmes would be more effective
if they included more career advice that is sector-specific and more narrowly
focused on opportunities available in the local labour market.
The ERA findings by no means imply that training is irrelevant to advancement.
However, they do suggest that other ways to try to ensure that training will have a
pay-off in the labour market ought to be considered and carefully tested.
6 Conclusions
Employment retention and advancement remain difficult challenges for many low-
income people. ERA was designed to address those challenges, but its success was
mixed. For some groups, ERA caused employment and earnings to increase more than
they would have without the programme—in some cases, by a great deal—and it also
yielded some positive cost-benefit results, both for participants and the Treasury. But
for other groups, ERA did not improve participants’ economic outcomes, and the
government’s budget incurred a net loss.
The evidence suggests that ERA’s strategies, although uneven in their effects, clearly
hold some promise. In particular, future efforts to promote employment retention and
advancement should consider testing whether certain changes in the design and
delivery of ERA’s incentives and in-work support and in the types of skills required of
advisers could help sustain and increase the programme’s early impacts for unemployed
and part-time employed lone parents (which faded after the programme ended). They
could also increase the magnitude of the effects (which were sustained) for long-term
unemployed men. In addition, ERA increased training completion for some groups
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market effects for other groups without increasing training. This suggests that it is im-
portant to re-think how to deliver training that aims to promote advancement and im-
prove incomes by building occupational skills.
Endnotes
1Income Support is an (almost) unconditional out-of-work benefit typically received
by individuals who are not employed or are working fewer than 16 h a week. Entitle-
ment for benefits depends on one’s other income, and its value varies with family size
and composition. It is roughly comparable to the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families programme in the US, although recipients are not required to look for work.
When ERA began, lone parents with children under age 16 could receive Income Sup-
port and were not required to look for work; currently, only those with children under
the age of seven are exempt from a work search requirement. Once their children reach
age seven, non-employed lone parents who are capable of and available to work must
actively seek employment and would receive Jobseeker’s Allowance rather than Income
Support.
2Jobseeker’s Allowance is a conditional cash benefit available in Britain to un-
employed individuals who are actively seeking work. Recent workers who built up enti-
tlements while employed can receive contribution-based payments for six months,
unaffected by other household income. The contributory portion of Jobseeker’s Allow-
ance is similar to the US unemployment insurance benefit. Other low-income people
can receive Jobseeker’s Allowance as a means-tested benefit and must be actively seek-
ing work.
3The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) oversaw the overall implementation
and evaluation of the programme. A research consortium, headed by MDRC (head-
quartered in New York City), and including Britain’s Policy Studies Institute, the Insti-
tute for Fiscal Studies, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, and the
Office for National Statistics, carried out the study. A subsidiary goal of the project was
to help build capacity in Britain to conduct randomised trials of promising social inno-
vations. This was accomplished through direct collaborative work between the US and
British research partners and DWP, and also through broader US-UK learning ex-
changes involving practitioners and researchers.
4In 1997, the OECD set 30 h as the cut-off to delineate part-time and full-time work
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1997). In ERA, part-time
work is tied to Working Tax Credit eligibility rules, which set the threshold at a mini-
mum of 16 h per week and specified that an extra amount is to be paid for work of 30
h or more per week.
5This provision was intended to accommodate the likelihood that many workers
might lose jobs and offered an incentive for quick re-employment.
6At the currency exchange rate in effect on 11 February 2008, these retention bonus
payments were equivalent to US$780 and US$4,680, respectively.
7Because of the voluntary nature of the experiment, many potential participants de-
cided not to participate. The percentage of nonparticipants ranged from 23 to 30 per
cent across the target groups. Chowdry & Sienese (2011) explore what the impacts
would have looked like had all eligibles participated in the experiment. They find that
Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 29 of 32“Overall, the findings either validate the 4-year interim experimental results of the main
ERA evaluation or indicate that the ERA intervention would have been even more ef-
fective for its full eligible population than it was for its actual participants.”
8See Walker et al. (2006) for a discussion of the random assignment process.
9Although there were differences across the target groups, random assignment did
achieve baseline equivalence of programme and control group characteristics within
each target group.
10GCSEs are the main national qualification for 14 to 16-year-olds taken in a range of
academic and applied subjects. GCSEs constitute levels 1 or 2 on the National Qualifi-
cations Framework, depending on the grade achieved. GCSE’s are a lower qualification
than advanced levels (‘A-levels’). A-levels are recognised as level 3 on the National
Qualifications Framework. They are normally completed in years 12 and 13 of second-
ary school (age 17 to 19 years) and follow from GCSEs. They are the main route into
higher education.
11For the ND25+ group, only two survey waves, at 12 and 24 months, were
conducted.
12As discussed in more detail in the final ERA report, the survey results are used cau-
tiously due to concerns about response bias, particularly for the last wave of the survey
(Hendra et al. 2011).
13The regression model consisted of exogenous characteristics chosen based on ex-
pected fit with the key employment and earnings outcomes. The covariates were all
measured at baseline and (because of random assignment) are orthogonal to treatment
group status. Covariates included prior work and barriers to working, race, region, edu-
cation, and a range of demographic variables.
14Further analysis found that despite the improvements in the programme over time,
the impacts of ERA did not vary by cohort for the two lone parent groups. There is
only limited evidence of strengthening in the ND25+ target group.
15This analysis is nonexperimental because it is only among those who worked.
Therefore, these results could be confounded by bias via selection into work.
16Earnings data from the 2004–2005 tax year were not used because, for some sample
members, that tax year included some months before the start of the study.
17Tests for the difference in these impact estimates were not conducted, though it is
unlikely that the impacts on employment and earnings were statistically different from
each other.
18A-level qualifications indicate that a person passed a series of advanced secondary
school examinations usually taken around age 18 or recognised equivalents that often
involve a more vocational element.
19Further analysis analysed impacts in the 2010–2011 tax year. For the two lone par-
ent target groups, results were similar to the 2009–2010 tax year (no statistically signifi-
cant impacts on employment or earnings). For the ND25+ target group, the estimated
impacts on earnings faded slightly to nonsignificance, but the impacts on employment
were still statistically significant (1.91 percentage points*)
20Further analysis found that impacts were concentrated among social housing resi-
dents, though the difference across subgroups was not statistically significant.
21The overall pattern of cost-benefit results holds up in the face of various sensitivity
checks using different assumptions, including shorter and longer time horizons.
Hendra et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:14 Page 30 of 3222As is almost always the case, several nonfinancial benefits and costs of the
programme are likely undercounted. However the analysis did try to monetise several
benefits such as effects on health and quality of life.
23The full analysis is presented in Richard Dorsett and Philip K. Robins, “A Multi-
Level Analysis of the Impacts of the UK Employment Retention and Advancement
Demonstration, Evaluation Review, 37 (2), April 2013, pp. 63–108.
24Earnings were also studied, and the results were qualitatively similar to those for
employment status.
25The interquartile range of programme impacts is the range between the 25th and
75th percentile of predicted impacts across offices.
26In their work on enterprise zones in the US, Kolko and Neumark (2010) make a
similar argument about the importance of analysing variation in implementation when
trying to understand the effects of public policy. In their work they find that enterprise
zones are more effective in locations where managers more aggressively market the
zones and where there is a lower share of manufacturing.
27While the UK ERA results are somewhat weaker than other financial incentive pro-
grammes, they are consistent with other employment programmes for low wage workers.
Hendra & Hamilton, (2015 forthcoming) provide a review of various programmes focused
on unemployed/employed low wage workers. Within that set of programmes, the UK
ERA results are broadly similar to many welfare-to-work programmes. Most of these pro-
grammes had positive estimated impacts that faded over time. Compared to other post-
employment services programmes (such as those studied in the Post Employment Services
Demonstration or the US Employment Retention and Advancement project), the UK
ERA results are more positive: many of those programmes had no estimated impacts on
employment or earnings (Rangaran et al., 1999 & Hendra et al., 2010). For another more
comprehensive review of active labour market programmes, see Card et al. (2010).
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